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Highlights 
 We investigated the Jumping to Conclusions (JTC) bias in high- and low-delusion-
prone groups  
 We used the ‘beads task’ and a conceptually similar ‘box task’ to assess JTC 
 All participants requested significantly less information on the beads task relative to the 
box task.  
 High-delusion-prone participants were significantly more conservative than low-
delusion-prone group. 
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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Previous research involving the probabilistic reasoning ‘beads 
task’ has consistently demonstrated a jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias, where individuals 
with delusions make decisions based on limited evidence. However, recent studies have 
suggested that miscomprehension may be confounding the beads task. The current study 
aimed to test the conventional beads task against a conceptually simpler probabilistic 
reasoning "box task". 
Methods: One hundred non-clinical participants completed both the beads task and the box 
task, and the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI) to assess for delusion-proneness. The 
number of ‘draws to decision’ was assessed for both tasks. Additionally, the total amount of 
on-screen evidence was manipulated for the box task, and two new box task measures were 
assessed (i.e., ‘proportion of evidence requested’ and ‘deviation from optimal solution’).  
Results: Despite being conceptually similar, the two tasks did not correlate, and participants 
requested significantly less information on the beads task relative to the box task. High-
delusion-prone participants did not demonstrate hastier decisions on either task; in fact, for 
box task, this group was observed to be significantly more conservative than low-delusion-
prone group. 
Limitations: Neither task was incentivised; results need replication with a clinical sample. 
Conclusion: Participants, and particularly those identified as high-delusion-prone, displayed 
a more conservative style of responding on the novel box task, relative to the beads task. The 
two tasks, whilst conceptually similar, appear to be tapping different cognitive processes. The 
implications of these results are discussed in relation to the JTC bias and the theoretical 
mechanisms thought to underlie it.  
Keywords: jumping-to-conclusions (JTC), beads task, box task, delusion-proneness  
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1. Introduction 
Recent research has looked into the role that cognitive-reasoning biases play in the 
formation and maintenance of delusions. The jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias is the most 
extensively studied cognitive bias in this literature, and is defined as hasty decisions based on 
less evidence, when compared to people without delusions or low delusional ideation. The 
most common approach to elucidate the JTC bias is a probabilistic reasoning task called the 
‘beads task’ (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). In a typical beads task, participants are shown 
two transparent containers filled with colored beads in different but reciprocal proportions. 
Once the containers have been removed from the participants view, they are then told that 
beads, one at a time and with subsequent replacement, will be randomly drawn from one of 
the two containers and they need to decide which container the bead sequence is coming from 
(which is actually predetermined to favour one container). The most common finding is that 
participants with delusions will request fewer ‘draws to decision’ and exhibit higher rates of 
JTC (i.e., defined as a decision on 1 or 2 beads) compared to participants without delusions 
(for a recent meta-analysis see McLean, Mattiske, & Balzan, 2016). The bias has also been 
shown to be heightened among ‘delusion-prone’ but otherwise healthy samples (Ross, 
McKay, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2015). 
Despite the apparent robustness of the beads task at elucidating the JTC bias, recent 
evidence suggests that the task may be confounded by poor task comprehension (Balzan, 
Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012; Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 2012). Specifically, 
both of these studies found that over half the sample failed to understand that all beads were 
drawn from the same jar, and that these ‘miscomprehending’ participants were significantly 
more likely to exhibit a JTC reasoning style. Against this high level of miscomprehension, it 
is possible that participants who ‘jump to conclusions’ on the first bead may have 
misinterpreted that the aim of the beads task is to determine which container this particular 
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bead is coming from, rather than considering the sequence of beads (e.g., up to 10 beads, 
which these participants never see). Participants who make a decision on the first bead may 
therefore be simply answering the question ‘where does this bead come from?’, and assume 
that the initial bead has come from the container with the larger proportion of that color, 
despite being told from the outset that they should be considering the ‘bead sequence’ as a 
whole. Additionally, the beads task is typically only presented once or twice in an effort to 
reduce practice effects (i.e., becoming aware that the sequence is predetermined). In other 
words, it is possible that due to the small number of replications, the frequency of the bias 
reported in the literature may be overstated. In support of this, one recent study found that 
when a fMRI-adapted version of the beads task was presented multiple times to the 
participants, group differences in JTC among ‘at-risk mental state’ patients compared to 
healthy controls could not be demonstrated beyond the initial trial (Rausch et al., 2015). Of 
course, this is not to suggest that all previously reported JTC represents miscomprehension; 
this confound can be ruled out for participants who make a decision on the second bead 
(which is still classed as ‘JTC’), as this implies they are basing their decision on the bead 
sequence.  
One of the aims of the current study is therefore to reduce this potential confound for 
those who JTC on the first bead, by using an alternative ‘draws to decision’ probabilistic 
reasoning task referred to as the 'box task'. The box task, adapted by the senior author from 
the Information Sampling Task of the CANTAB Battery (Clark, Robbins, Ersche, & 
Sahakian, 2006), is conceptually much simpler than the beads task. Participants are shown a 
number of grey boxes on screen (e.g., 25), each of which conceals one of two colors. 
Participants are told that one color is always in the majority (e.g., 80%), and that they must 
decide which color this is by clicking on as many of the grey boxes as they wish. Once they 
have decided which color is in the majority they are told to click on that color at the bottom 
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of the screen. Importantly, the total amount of potential evidence is immediately available 
and obvious from the outset of the task (e.g., 25 boxes), reinforcing the notion that 
participants have the ability to consider a sequence of evidence should they choose to (as 
opposed to the beads task, where this is not as obvious from the outset). Therefore, should a 
participant make a decision on the first opened box, it is more likely to represent genuine JTC 
rather than a misunderstanding of the task’s instructional set. 
Moreover, the box task offers the opportunity to systematically manipulate factors 
affecting the salience of the evidence; for example, in addition to altering the ratio of 
evidence, as typically done in the beads task (e.g., 80/20 vs. 60/40 ratio), the box task can 
also vary the total amount of evidence that participants can choose from the outset of the task 
(e.g., 25 boxes, 49 boxes, 100 boxes). In this way, the box task can more effectively 
manipulate the strength of the evidence requested; that is, the salience of the evidence will be 
stronger when participants can choose from 25 on-screen boxes compared to when they have 
49 boxes to choose from. This manipulation becomes useful when investigating the 
underlying mechanisms of the JTC bias. For example, several studies have posited that 
heightened JTC may be driven by a hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches, whereby 
people with delusions are more likely to make hasty decisions when faced with hypothesis-
congruent evidence (e.g., Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 2014; Speechley, 
Whitman, & Woodward, 2010). It follows that people with delusional tendencies should 
request less evidence when hypothesis-evidence matches are stronger, relative to non-
delusional individuals. 
Furthermore, the box task has an objective endpoint, which allows the requested 
‘proportion of evidence’ to be determined in addition to just raw ‘draws to decision’. This 
becomes important when comparing different on-screen box quantities (e.g., 25 with 49 
boxes), as participants may request more raw ‘draws to decision’ with 49 boxes compared to 
Beads Task vs. Box Task 7 
25 boxes, but this might simultaneously represent proportionally less evidence. Having an 
objectively correct number of ‘draws’ on the box task also allows a ‘deviation from optimal 
solution’ measure to be determined. For example, on an 80/20 ratio with 25 boxes, it would 
only take 6 draws of the same color to determine the solution with full confidence; the 
number of draws below this solution would represent objective JTC, while draws above this 
would represent objective conservatism.  
In sum, due to some slight methodological differences, the box task may offer some 
advantages over the beads task (i.e., may reduce miscomprehension, easy to modify salience 
of evidence, has a definite solution, multiple trials). Despite these differences, the two tasks 
should still be consistent in the way they assess the ‘draws to decision’ construct. 
Accordingly, it is expected that participants who categorically JTC on the beads task (i.e., 
decision made ≤ 2 beads) will also request less evidence on the box task, consistent with a 
pilot study comparing the beads and box tasks (Chu, Sun, & So, 2015). Moreover, as JTC has 
been shown to be heightened in delusional groups, it is also expected that high-delusion-
prone participants will request less evidence than the low-delusion-prone participants in both 
the beads and box task. Finally, throughout the box task, high-delusion-prone participants 
should request proportionally less evidence and exhibit objectively greater hastiness than 
low-delusion-prone participants, particularly for box scenarios where the salience of evidence 
is stronger. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
A total of 100 undergraduate students (76 females, 24 males) were recruited from 
Flinders University for partial course requirement or a small amount of reimbursement for 
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their time. They were aged 18 – 62 years (M = 23.56, SD = 7.30). Participants were excluded 
if they had impaired color vision (relevant to both bead/box tasks).  
 
2.2. Materials 
 2.2.1. The beads task. Participants were presented with an adapted computerized 
version of the original beads task (Huq et al., 1988), using the ‘draws to decision’ method and 
the standard conventional instructional set (for full details see McLean et al., 2016). They 
were shown a picture of two containers filled with 100 colored beads in reciprocal 
proportions (one trial with a bead ratio of 80/20 and one trial of ratio 60/40; ratio order was 
randomised between participants). They were told that the computer would randomly select 
beads from one container, and that the goal of the task was to determine which container the 
bead sequence was coming from. However, the task had a predetermined sequence of (up to) 
ten beads per trial, and ended once a container had been selected (note: if a decision was not 
made by 10 beads, the ‘draws to decision’ score was classified as 11). Pictures of the 
containers remained displayed during the task to ensure that participants remembered the 
proportion of beads in each container, and the sequence of beads was also shown at the top of 
the screen as it emerged. Participants were shown an example in an effort to reduce 
miscomprehension.  
2.2.2. The box task. The box task was conceptually similar to the beads task. A 
number of grey squares (‘boxes’) were displayed on a screen (i.e., 25 boxes or 49 boxes), 
with each box concealing one of two colors, as shown at the bottom of the screen in two 
larger rectangular boxes (see Figure 1). Boxes were presented in certain ratios (e.g., ten trials 
of 80/20; ten trials of 60/40). The ratio for each particular trial was displayed in the top left of 
the screen. Participants were told that the goal of the task was to determine which color was 
represented the majority of the time (i.e., 80% or 60%), referred to as the ‘dominant color’. 
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At the beginning of the trial all of the boxes were shown in grey (i.e., closed). Participants 
were required to mouse-click these grey boxes to reveal or 'open' the colour of the box, and 
were able to open as many as they wanted, in any order, before making a decision which was 
the dominant color by clicking on one of the two larger rectangles at the bottom of the screen. 
In this way, the box task was not pre-sequenced and participants thereby saw a random 
sequence of colors (unlike the beads task, which used a predetermined sequence). 
Participants were given two practice trials of 25 boxes to reduce miscomprehension (one per 
ratio). The number of boxes presented was manipulated to change the salience of the 
available evidence. There were 20 trials overall; 10 trials of 80/20 ratio (5 with 25 boxes; 5 
with 49 boxes) and 10 trials of 60/40 ratio (5 with 25 boxes; 5 with 49 boxes). 
2.2.3. The Peters et al. Delusional Inventory (21 Item). The Peters et al. Delusional 
Inventory (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004) is designed to assess delusion-proneness in 
the general population. The 21-item PDI has good psychometric properties, and had high 
internal consistency within the present sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .93). The measure 
includes four components: a yes/no score, and measures of distress, preoccupation and 
conviction (each ranged from 0 to 5). Higher scores indicate increased tendency for delusion-
proneness. Upper and lower quartiles were taken to classify participants into low-delusion-
prone (scores ≤ 27; n = 28) and high-delusion-prone (scores ≥ 84; n = 23).  
 2.2.4. Wechsler Test of Adult Reading. To rule out the possibility delusion-prone 
and non-delusion-prone groups are different in regards to their intellectual functioning, both 
groups completed the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) (Wechsler, 2001), which is 
co-normed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence and Memory Scales (WAIS-III). There were 
no significant differences in predicted full-scale intelligence scores between the low- (M = 
106.79, SD = 8.07) and high- (M = 103.43, SD = 7.19) delusion-prone participants, t(49) = 
1.55, p = .128. 
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 2.2.5. Demographic information. Age, gender, and level of education were recorded. 
All participants were asked ‘which task did you prefer?’, which served to gauge the 
subjective feasibility of the box task.  
 
2.3. Measures 
 2.3.1. Draws to decision. The number of draws to reach a definite decision on both 
the beads and box task. 
2.3.2. Proportion of evidence requested. The raw number of ‘draws to decision’ for 
the box task was converted into a percentage to determine the proportion of evidence 
requested before reaching a definite decision (e.g., 10 boxes out of 25 is 40% of the 
evidence). This measure could not be calculated for the beads task because participants were 
unaware the task would terminate after 10 beads and beads were replaced after each trial.  
 2.3.3. Deviation from optimal solution. For the box task, a ‘deviation for optimal 
solution’ measure was created by first assessing the number of ‘dominant color’ boxes 
selected by participants. The objective optimal number of ‘dominant color’ boxes was then 
determined for each condition
1
, and this was subtracted from the number of dominant color 
boxes selected by the participant. Positive numbers indicated that participants were 
demonstrating a conservative response style (i.e., requesting more evidence than required), 
while negative numbers indicated that participants were objectively jumping to conclusions 
(i.e., requesting less evidence than required). This variable could not be created for the beads 
task as beads were replaced after each trial (i.e., no objective ‘solution’).  
 2.3.4. Independent variables. The study used a mixed design. Within-subjects 
independent variables were task type (beads, box); ratio type (80/20, 60/40); and box quantity 
                                                          
1 Optimal number of dominant color boxes: 80/20 ratio-25 boxes = 6 boxes; 80/20 ratio-49 boxes = 11 boxes; 
60/40 ratio-25 boxes = 11 boxes; 60/40 ratio-49 boxes = 21 boxes. 
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(25 boxes, 49 boxes) The between-subjects independent variable was delusion proneness 
(low- and high-delusion-prone). 
 
2.4. Procedure  
The experiment took place in the Cognitive Neuropsychiatry Laboratory in the School 
of Psychology at Flinders University. Each session took approximately 20 minutes. After 
providing informed consent, participants completed the computer tasks, followed by the 
demographics questionnaire, the PDI, and the WTAR. The beads task was created using the 
program, SuperLab 4.5. The box task was adapted by the senior author at University of 
Hamburg, using Microsoft Visual Studio. The order that the box and the beads task were 
presented was counterbalanced, with equal numbers in each task type. The study was 
approved by the Social and Behavioural Science Research Ethics Committee (Flinders 
University).    
 
3. Results 
3.1. Beads vs. Box 
 3.1.1. Draws to decision. Beads and box ‘draws to decision’ totals were calculated by 
averaging the number of ‘draws to decisions’ across each ratio type (i.e., 80/20; 60/40). 
Participants requested significantly less evidence on the beads task than the box task, t(99) = 
17.47, p < .001, d = 2.55. As shown in Table 1, when breaking down both tasks to ratio type, 
participants requested significantly less evidence on both the 80/20, t(99) = 15.47, p < .001, d 
= 2.23 and 60/40, t(99) = 17.54, p < .001, d = 2.54, versions of the beads task relative to the 
box task.  
(Table 1 about here) 
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To ensure that the lower draws to decisions score on the beads task was not simply 
due to the beads task terminating after the presentation of 10 beads, a McNemar test was 
conducted. Participants were significantly less likely to request more than 10 pieces of 
evidence on the 80/20 ratio for the beads task (2%) compared to the box task (64%), p < .001. 
Similarly on the 60/40 ratio only 33% of participants on the beads task requested more than 
10 pieces of evidence compared to 96% on the box task, (p < .001). Thus, despite the beads 
task not having a ‘definite end point’, these results indicate that the majority of participants 
would have made their decision before 10 beads even if the task had not terminated at this 
point.  
Correlational analyses showed that there was no significant association between the 
draws to decision scores on either version of the beads task and the box tasks (see Table 2); 
although there was a trend towards a significant negative correlation between 60/40 beads 
task and the 80/20 box task (r = -.188, p = .06). Overall, this supports the idea that different 
factors might be affecting performance patterns on each task. 
3.1.2. Jumping to conclusions. Independent samples t-tests assessed group 
differences on the box task (i.e., draws to decision, proportion of evidence requested and 
deviation from optimal) between participants who categorically jumped to conclusions (i.e., 
asked ≤ 2 beads) and those who requested more information during the beads task. Of note, 
the majority of these ‘JTC participants’ made their decision on the first bead (n = 19/30), and 
may have therefore miscomprehended the task; in contrast, no participant made a decision on 
the first trial of the box task. As shown in Table 3, JTC participants selected significantly 
more evidence and were objectively more conservative on the box task relative to those 
participants who did not demonstrate JTC during the beads task (t(98) = 2.50, 2.47, 2.49, p < 
.05, for box draws to decision, proportion of evidence, deviation from optimal measures, 
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respectively
2
). This is also consistent the negative correlation trend between the 60/40 beads 
task and the 80/20 box task (i.e., less evidence for beads implies more evidence for box). This 
again suggests that participants may be using different strategies when completing each task 
(i.e., if JTC on beads, should request less evidence on the conceptually similar box task).  
(Table 3 about here) 
 3.1.3. Preference. To gauge the subjective feasibility of the box task, participants 
were asked whether they preferred the beads task or the box task. Participants were more 
likely to prefer the box task (76%) over the beads task (24%), despite the fact that the box 
task had 20 trials (beads task only had 2). This preference for the longer box task suggests 
that it may be more intuitive and easier to comprehend relative to the beads task. 
 
3.2. Delusion-proneness 
 3.2.1. Draws to Decision. Total Peters et al. Delusional Inventory (PDI) scores across 
the sample were correlated with the total number of draws to decision on the beads and the 
box task. A non-significant relationship was found between both tasks and the total PDI score 
(beads task: r = -.082, p = .424; box task: r = .161, p = .114); no PDI subscale score (i.e., 
distress, preoccupation, conviction) was significant either. This suggests that delusion-
proneness, as assessed by the PDI, was not related to draws to decision in the current sample.    
To test whether high-delusion-prone participants would request less evidence than the 
low-delusion-prone participants in both tasks, upper and lower quartiles of the PDI were 
taken to classify participants into low-delusion-prone (scores ≤ 27; n = 28) or high-delusion-
prone (scores ≥ 84; n = 23). There were no group differences between low- and high-
delusion-proneness in age (low: M = 24.43, SD = 9.27; high: M = 22.61, SD = 5.53; t(49) < 
                                                          
2
 These analyses were repeated for the subset of participants who showed JTC on the first bead with similar 
results (i.e., t(98) = 2.50, 2.47, 2.49, p < .05, for box draws to decision, proportion of evidence, deviation from 
optimal measures, respectively) 
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1); gender (low: female/male = 20/8; high: female/male = 18/5; 2 (1, N = 51) < 1); or years 
of education (low: M = 15.00, SD = 2.21; high: M = 14.09, SD = 2.57; t(49) = 1.36, p = 0.18). 
  An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess whether high- and low-
delusion prone participants performed differently on the beads and box task. As seen in Table 
4, there were no significant group differences for delusion-proneness on the beads task, t(49) 
< 1, d = .12 or the box task, t(49) =  1.49, p = .143, d = .42.  
(Table 4 about here) 
For the beads task, high-delusion-prone participants were requesting less evidence 
relative to low-delusion-prone participants which, although non-significant, was in the 
direction consistent with previous literature. Conversely on the box task, there was a trend for 
high-delusion-prone participants to request more evidence compared to low-delusion-prone 
participants, which is inconsistent with previous JTC research.  
 
 3.2.2. Proportion of Evidence Requested. To test the hypothesis that high-delusion-
prone participants would request proportionally less evidence when evidence for the correct 
solution was more salient (i.e., 80/20 with 25 boxes vs. 60/40 with 49 boxes), a 2 Ratio 
(80/20, 60/40) x 2 Box quantity (25, 49) x 2 Delusion-proneness (high, low) mixed between-
within subjects ANOVA was conducted. Table 5 summarises the proportion of evidence 
requested by ratio, box quantity and delusion-proneness, and suggests both groups were 
requesting less evidence for 49 than 25 boxes (F(1,49) = 60.06, p < .01, p
2
 = .55), which is 
in contrast to the predicted direction. The 3-way interaction between these factors was non-
significant, F(1, 49) < 1. There was a significant 2-way interaction between box quantity and 
delusion-proneness, F(1,49) = 4.10, p = .048, p
 2
 = .08, suggesting that the low-delusion-
prone group were requesting relatively less evidence for 49-box condition compared to the 
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high-delusion-prone-group (see Figure 2). Although pairwise comparisons between high- (M 
= 49.05, SD = 18.52) and low-delusion-prone groups (M = 39.99, SD = 17.87) suggest this 
difference for the 49-box condition overall was non-significant, F(1,49) = 3.15, p = .08, p
2
 = 
.06, a pairwise comparison between groups for the 49-box condition under the 80/20 ratio 
revealed that the low-delusion-prone group was requesting significantly less evidence, 
F(1,49) = 6.30, p = .02, p
2
 = .11 (see Table 5). There was also a significant correlation 
between delusion-proneness (total PDI across the sample) and the 49-box condition under the 
80/20 ratio, r = .24, p = .02 (but not for the PDI subscales). These findings appear to be in 
contrast to previous JTC literature (i.e., low-delusion-prone group requesting less evidence) 
and the ‘hypersalience’ hypothesis (i.e., the high-delusion-prone group requested less 
evidence when each piece of evidence was ‘weaker’ in the 49-box condition). No other 2-
way interaction was significant.  
(Table 5 about here) 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 3.2.3. Deviation from Optimal. A 2 Ratio (80/20, 60/40) x 2 Box quantity (25, 49) x 
2 Delusion-proneness (high, low) mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was conducted to 
test the hypothesis that high-delusion-prone participants would deviate further (< 0) from the 
optimal solution when evidence was stronger (i.e., 80/20 with 25 boxes vs. 60/40 with 49 
boxes). Mean deviation from optimal scores for both groups across these conditions are 
summarised in Table 6. The 3-way interaction was significant, F(1,49) = 4.17, p = .047, p
 2
 
= .08. Figure 2 shows the 2-way interactions for box quantity and delusion-proneness 
separately by ratio (i.e., 80/20, 60/40).  
 For the 80/20 ratio, the 2-way interaction was significant F(1,49) = 10.79, p = .002, 
p
2
 = .18, and suggested that the low-delusion-prone group shifted from a conservative to a 
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more optimal response strategy as the number of on-screen boxes increased, whereas the 
high-delusion-prone group became even more conservative as the number of boxes increased 
(Figure 3A). The pairwise comparison between groups for the 49-box condition under the 
80/20 ratio revealed that the high-delusion-prone group was significantly more conservative, 
F(1,49) = 6.26, p = .02, p
2
 = .11 (see Table 6) and there was a significant correlation 
between delusion-proneness (across the sample) and the 49-box condition under the 80/20 
ratio, (r = .24, p = .02), consistent with the ‘proportion of evidence requested’ findings above. 
These deviation from optimal results for the 80/20 ratio condition suggest that the box task is 
inconsistent with previous JTC findings in both a relative and an absolute sense (i.e., high-
delusion-prone individuals are relatively and objectively more conservative than low-
delusion-prone individuals); however, unlike the proportion of evidence findings, they were 
somewhat consistent with the hypersalience mechanism (i.e., high-delusion-prone individuals 
became more conservative with weaker evidence).  
 The results for the 60/40 condition were vastly different, in that both groups adopted a 
near-optimal strategy for 25 boxes, yet became very biased (i.e., < 0) in the 49 box condition 
(Figure 3B). Again, the low-delusion-prone group appeared to be more biased, but the 2-way 
box quantity and group interaction for the 60/40 ratio was non-significant F(1,49) = 1.65, p = 
.21, p
2
 = .03.  
(Table 6 about here) 
(Figure 3A/B about here) 
4. Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias across 
two conceptually similar probabilistic reasoning tasks. This study represents one of the first 
attempts at using the novel ‘box task’ to assess JTC.  
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4.1. Beads vs. Box 
The findings clearly show differences between the tasks, whereby participants 
requested significantly fewer ‘draws to decision’ on the beads task compared to the box task. 
This is despite (i) the beads task having no definite ‘endpoint’ or solution (i.e., participants 
were unaware that the task would terminate after 10 beads); (ii) that beads were replaced after 
each trial (i.e., which should increase sampling relative to a condition where evidence is 
drawn without replacement, like the box task); and (iii) that the evidence is weaker for the 
beads task (i.e., 1 bead out of 100 total beads vs. 1 box out of 25 or 49 boxes). Accordingly, 
participants should have been more conservative on the beads task.  
It is also clear from the current findings that participants showed different patterns of 
responding for both tasks. Specifically, participants who displayed JTC on the beads task 
(i.e., decision ≤ 2 beads) requested significantly more information on the box task and were 
objectively more conservative relative to non-JTC participants. Moreover, unlike a recent 
pilot study (Chu et al., 2015), the two tasks did not significantly correlate with one another 
(although there was trend towards a negative correlation between the 60/40 beads and 80/20 
box tasks). These findings suggest that the beads and the box task may be assessing different 
cognitive mechanisms that influence the way participants respond on conceptually similar 
tasks. 
The fact that beads task terminated after 10 beads cannot account for the hastier 
decision-making style, as the majority of participants decided before even reaching 10 beads. 
There are a few reasons could that account for these differences. First, the hastier decision-
making on the beads task may actually reflect miscomprehension, at least for the 19 
participants who made their decision on the first bead, and may have therefore erroneously 
assumed that the task was to judge where that first bead came from (rather than the bead 
sequence). On the box, it is much easier for participants to comprehend that there is a 
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sequence of evidence to consider, as participants are presented with all the potential evidence 
from the outset, thereby reducing the likelihood that any miscomprehension could result. The 
box task is also conceptually simpler, and hypothetically easier to understand, which was 
indirectly supported by the observation that participants had a greater preference for the box 
task over the beads task (despite its longer length).  
Nevertheless, this explanation does not seem to account for why the remaining 81 
participants, who made decisions at two or more beads, still selected less evidence on the 
beads task compared to the box task. However, it could be the very fact that the box task 
makes it easier for participants to comprehend the nature of task (i.e., to consider a sequence 
of evidence) that encourages them into a ‘conservative’ responding style. For example, 
although it should only take 6 draws of the same color to determine the solution with full 
confidence on an 80/20 ratio with 25 boxes, this could leave up to 19 ‘unopened’ boxes 
onscreen, which might prompt doubt or uncertainty (‘second-guessing’). By this rationale, it 
is possible that if the beads task displayed the total number of drawn beads on the screen and 
allowed participants to self-select evidence from this line of ‘unknown’ beads (i.e., like the 
box task), the results may have be similar; future comparisons should test this proposition. 
Importantly, the tasks also differ with regard to the randomness of the sequence (i.e., 
the color sequence is predetermined for the beads task but is random for the box task). The 
randomised color sequence in the box task implies that participants may not have been seeing 
the ‘dominant’ box color until later in the sequence, relative to the beads task where the 
‘dominant’ color was obvious from the beginning of the sequence. While this is unlikely to 
be the main reason participants requested almost four times more information on the box task, 
future box task studies should ensure a predetermined color sequence between participants.  
 
4.2. Delusion-proneness 
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The hypothesis that high-delusion-prone participants would request less evidence than 
the low-delusion-prone participants in both the beads and box task was unsupported. For the 
beads task, there was a small trend that high-delusion-prone individuals requested less 
evidence, yet this was non-significant. These results can be compared to those from a recent 
meta-analysis on delusional ideation and JTC, which reported a small but significant negative 
correlation between ‘draws to decision’ and delusion-proneness (r = -.10) with high-delusion-
prone participants typically found to request less evidence (Ross et al., 2015). However, 
given that this meta-analysis only reported a small effect size from a pooled sample of 1754 
participants from the general population, it is possible that the current results lacked 
sufficient power to detect any differences between high- and low-delusion-proneness. 
The box task allowed for greater exploration of the relationship between JTC and 
delusion-proneness because the total evidence participants could request could be 
manipulated (i.e., 25 or 49 boxes), and it also included two additional measures of hasty 
decision-making (i.e., proportion of evidence requested; deviation from optimal solution). 
Specifically, it was predicted that high-delusion-prone participants would request 
proportionally less evidence and exhibit objectively greater JTC (i.e., greater negative 
deviation from the optimal solution), particularly for box scenarios where the salience of 
evidence was stronger (i.e., 80/20 ratio with 25 boxes). However, the results from the box 
task were inconsistent with these predictions, in that the high-delusion-prone group was more 
conservative than the low-delusion-prone group, whether observing ‘draws to decision’, 
‘proportion of evidence requested’, or the ‘deviation from optimal’ measures. The high/low-
delusion-proneness pairwise comparisons were for the most part non-significant across 
conditions. However, for the 80/20 ratio with 49 boxes, it was evident that the high-delusion-
prone group were significantly more conservative, as they requested proportionally more 
evidence and conservatively deviated from the optimal solution (in contrast, the low-
Beads Task vs. Box Task 20 
delusion-prone group approached the optimal solution for this condition). This directly 
contradicts the established set of findings within the JTC literature, in which high-delusional 
groups are usually found to request less evidence (e.g., Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007; 
McLean et al., 2016). The hypersalience mechanism was also largely unsupported by the 
current findings, as both groups appeared to request less evidence when the salience of the 
evidence became weaker; although for the 80/20 ratio condition, the high-delusion-prone 
group did exhibit greater conservatism for the 49-box condition (i.e., greater conservatism for 
‘weak’ evidence). 
Given the current study represents one of the first to employ the box task within a 
probabilistic reasoning context, we can only speculate as to the causes of these discrepant 
findings. Overall, it is appears that all participants, irrespective of delusion-proneness, were 
more conservative on the box task relative to the beads task. We have argued that 
miscomprehension, as well as differences in the way evidence was presented may partially 
account for these differences (i.e., all the potential evidence is available from the beginning; 
predetermined vs. random sequences). However, when considering ratio type and box 
quantity variables, it becomes apparent that there may be an additional factor contributing to 
the more conservative approach observed for the box task. It is clear from the results that all 
participants demonstrated a hastier decision-making strategy when they were presented with 
49-boxes. This suggests that the subjective ‘cost’ of responding for more evidence in the 49-
box condition was higher than in the 25-box condition, due to the extra time and effort it 
would require to request the same proportion of boxes. Arguably, decision-making would 
become relatively hastier with more available evidence to choose from (e.g., 100 boxes, 200 
boxes, etc).  Although each piece of evidence is technically ‘weaker’ under such conditions 
(i.e., 1 of 25 ‘stronger’ than 1 of 49), the threshold to keep requesting more evidence 
becomes higher as more effort/time is required. This could account for why the hypersalience 
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mechanism was not supported (i.e., subjective ‘cost’ was too great as the number of boxes 
increased). Importantly, it appears the influence of this ‘cost’ factor differed depending on 
group and the ratio of evidence. For example, the high-delusion-prone group, in contrast to 
the low-delusion-prone-group, became surprisingly more conservative as the number of 
boxes increased under the 80:20 ratio (i.e., the cost of requesting more information was not 
strong enough to alert them to stop collecting superfluous evidence, as it was under 60/40 
ratio). Assuming the hypersalience mechanism is heightened within the high-delusion-prone 
group, they may have ‘enjoyed’ collecting more evidence under the 49-box 80:20 ratio 
condition, as most of the self-selected boxes would have ‘matched’ the dominant color (not 
necessarily the case under a 60:40 ratio, with more ‘misses’).  
At present, there is no clear explanation for why the heightened ‘conservatism’ might 
have occurred (i.e., the higher salience of evidence under the 80/20 ratio should have made 
the subjective cost of requesting more evidence higher not lower). Nevertheless, future 
replications could look at further increasing the ‘cost’ of responding under different ratios by 
adding a monetary incentive to the task or using a points system, similar to a recently 
incentivized version of the beads task (van der Leer, Hartig, Goldmanis, & McKay, 2014). 
Future studies should also aim to extend these findings to individuals with clinical delusions, 
to assess how delusional severity affects the interaction between salience of the evidence and 
cost of responding on measures of hasty decision-making. Finally, future replications 
comparing both tasks could utilize the “graded estimates” method, where participants provide 
probability estimates (e.g., 0 to 100%) that a particular bead (or box) is from one of the two 
containers (or is the dominant color); this additional measure could provide more specificity 
into how participants are comparatively viewing the evidence on each task. 
 
4.3. Conclusions 
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The present study found that all participants were much more conservative on the box 
task relative to the beads task. It is possible that the hastier decision-making observed for the 
beads task is partially due to miscomprehension of the more complex instructional set of the 
task and the subtle methodological differences between the two conceptually similar tasks. 
Hasty decision-making was not related to delusion-proneness for either task; for the box task, 
high-delusion-proneness was more associated with heightened conservatism. Nevertheless, 
the box task may be an interesting platform by which to further investigate probabilistic 
reasoning, and more research is required before we can jump to any conclusions about its 
suitability in assessing JTC in delusional groups.  
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*p < .001  
 
  
 Task Type 
Ratio Type Beads Task Box Task 
80/20* 3.51 (2.06) 13.53 (6.02) 
60/40* 6.55 (3.59) 21.88 (7.73) 
Total* 5.03 (2.57) 17.70 (6.55) 
Table 1: Mean (SD) draws to decision across condition on both the beads and the box tasks 
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 Beads Task 
Box Task  80/20 60/40 
80/20 -.062 (.54) -.188 (.06) 
60/40
 
.017 (.86) -.067 (.51) 
Table 2: Pearson correlations (p-values) between 80/20 and 60/40 versions of the 
beads and box tasks (n = 100) 
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1
Positive deviation from optimal scores indicate an objective conservative response style (i.e., 
requesting more evidence than required); negative scores indicate objective jumping to conclusions 
(i.e., requesting less evidence than required) 
*p < .05 
  
 JTC on Beads 
Box Task Measure JTC ≤ 2 beads (n = 30) No JTC (n = 70) 
Draws to decision* 20.14 (7.07) 16.66 (6.07) 
Proportion of evidence* 55.90 (18.43) 46.84 (15.99) 
Deviation from optimal*
 
1.48 (4.92) -0.90 (4.13) 
 JTC on first bead (n = 19) No JTC (n = 81) 
Draws to decision* 20.69 (6.77) 17.00 (6.34) 
Proportion of evidence* 57.35 (17.58) 47.37 (16.67) 
Deviation from optimal*
 
1.91 (4.72) -0.68 (4.32) 
Table 3: Mean (SD) draws to decision, proportion of evidence requested (%), and 
deviation from optimal
1
 scores for the box task (averaged across conditions) by 
JTC (decision on ≤ 2 beads and on first bead) on the beads task.  
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 Task Type 
Delusion-Proneness  Beads Task Box Task  
Low 4.98 (2.40) 16.67 (6.19) 
High 4.67 (2.72) 19.25 (6.09) 
Table 4: Mean (SD) draws to decision scores for low- and high-delusion-prone 
participants across the beads and box task (averaged across 80/20 and 60/40 
conditions).  
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*p = .02, between low- and high-delusion-proneness 
 
 
 
  
  Delusion-proneness 
Ratio Type Box Quantity Low (N = 28) High ( N = 23) 
80/20 25 42.03 (18.27) 46.12 (14.90) 
 49 28.40 (14.87)* 39.57 (16.91) 
60/40 25 67.97 (19.06) 69.57 (16.76) 
 49 51.57 (22.61) 58.53 (22.62) 
Table  5: Mean (SD) proportion of evidence requested (%) for low- and high-delusion-
prone participants across the box task.  
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1
Positive deviation from optimal scores indicate an objective conservative response style (i.e., 
requesting more evidence than required); negative scores indicate objective jumping to conclusions 
(i.e., requesting less evidence than required) 
*p = .02, between low- and high-delusion-proneness 
 
 
  
  Delusion-proneness 
Ratio Type Box Quantity Low (N = 28) High ( N = 23) 
80/20 25 2.82 (3.48) 3.15 (2.90) 
 49 0.22 (5.79)* 4.58 (6.66) 
60/40 25 -0.66 (2.82) -0.04 (2.43) 
 49 -6.01 (6.71) -3.63 (6.58) 
Table  6: Mean deviation from optimal scores
1
 (SD) for low-and-high-delusion-prone 
participants across the box task.  
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Figure 1: A screenshot of the box task with 25 boxes in the 80/20 ratio. Participants had 
‘opened’ 6 boxes (modified for black and white) 
Analogy 80/20 
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Figure 2: Proportion (%) of evidence (with standard error bars) requested for low-and-high-
delusion-prone participants across the box task (averaged across 80/20 and 60/40 
ratio conditions).  
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Figure 3A: Deviation from optimal scores (with standard error bars) for low- and-high-
 delusion-prone participants across 25 and 49 box task conditions for the 80/20 ratio 
(> 0 indicates conservatism) 
Figure 3B: Deviation from optimal scores (with standard error bars) for low-and-high-
delusion-prone participants across 25 and 49 box task conditions for the 60/40 
ratio (< 0 indicates JTC) 
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*p = .002 
